The network structure that encompasses a firm's commercial alliances creates both potential strategic benefits and potential risks for collaborative activities. Extant literature shows that the embedding of alliance activity in the pre-existing network structure when selecting partners produces informational, reputational, and social monitoring benefits that help firms mitigate collaboration hazards (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997) . However, firms face obstacles to effective collaboration even after they create seemingly desirable linkages (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000) . Network embeddedness is relevant to alliance success because, in addition to assisting partner selection, embeddedness promotes cohesion between partners during the course of collaboration (Kogut, 1989; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Park & Russo, 1996) . In many cases, though, the frictions that occur during alliance life are so severe that the cohesive effects of embeddedness are not sufficient to ensure alliance stability (Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, forthcoming) . Despite our growing understanding of the cohesive and frictional forces affecting alliance longevity, the literature remains silent about the reasons that many alliances experience frictions if embeddedness helps firms avoid forming such alliances in the first place. Further, the literature has not examined the possibility that the cohesive effects of embeddedness are stronger in relationships that are more vulnerable to collaboration problems.
To further our understanding of how network embeddedness influences alliance instability, we examine unplanned joint venture dissolution. Although partners invest significant relationship-specific resources in the formation of a joint venture with the goal of reaping joint benefits (Gulati, 1995a; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000) , firms have incentives to compete with their partners, which can eclipse the benefits of collaboration and lead to joint venture dissolution (Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 1997) . Partners can dissolve a joint venture for a variety of reasons, including the successful achievement of their goals because the demands of antitrust authorities. We focus explicitly on unplanned joint venture dissolutions that occur because of problems arising during the course of the alliance.
Such problems are particularly likely to occur when partners are close competitors (Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 1997) , when partners perceive inequity in contributions to the venture (Arino & Torre, 1998) , or when changes in the market make the venture more attractive for one of the partners (Kogut, 1991; Li, Dhanaraj, & Shockley, 2008) . In the empirical section we detail the procedure we used to identify unplanned joint venture dissolution.
To date, the literature on alliance dissolution has focused primarily on relational embeddedness 1 , that is, on how the history of interactions between two partners influences the quality and strength of their direct ties (Moran, 2005; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) . Direct ties provide partners with superior information about each other, engender knowledge-based trust (Gulati, 1995b; Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995) and, as a result, mitigate tie instability (Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996; Uzzi, 1996) . This study, in contrast, considers the influences of the broader network structure and investigates how the informational and reputational benefits of positional embeddedness (partners' position in the network structure;
e.g., Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996) and the social monitoring advantages of structural embeddedness (the presence of common partners between firms; e.g., Coleman, 1988; Gulati, 1995b; Walker et al., 1997) affect the hazard of unplanned joint venture dissolution.
When examining how network embeddedness affects unplanned joint venture dissolution, this study highlights the tradeoff that firms face between incentives to form an alliance and problems that can arise during the life of the alliance. In general, before forming an alliance, firms can be expected to balance problems that might arise during collaboration against the potential alliance benefits, and to only form the partnership if the anticipated problems are not severe enough to offset the projected benefits. However, this interpretation ignores the possibility that new and only partially predictable circumstances arising during the course of collaboration often shift the balance of partners' incentives, thereby engendering unexpected instability.
This study shows that many alliances turn out to be unstable because the expectation of deriving substantial benefits sometimes leads firms to create alliances that also have a substantial 1 Greve et al. (forthcoming) , who examine the influences of positional and structural embeddedness on member withdrawal from interfirm alliances, provide a notable exception.
chance to be unstable. For instance, although the reputational imbalance inherent in asymmetric relationships is a source of instability, firms sometimes form asymmetric partnerships with the expectation of accessing complementary resources (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Mitchell & Singh, 1996) . Likewise, although firms that exhibit greater resource similarity and market commonality have greater propensity to engage in interfirm rivalry (Chen, 1996) , which is a source of instability, firms sometimes ally with partners that have a high level of competitive overlap in order to manage mutual competitive interdependence or enjoy scale benefits (Gimeno, 2004; Kogut, 1988; Park & Ungson, 2001; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976) . Network embeddedness becomes relevant during the course of collaboration because it mitigates collaboration hazards, especially in alliances that have high risk of experiencing implementation problems.
This study furthers network research by showing that the effects of network embeddedness on alliance dissolution are not simply the mirror image of its effects on alliance formation. Typically, network embeddedness affects alliance formation by indicating partnerships that are less likely to experience collaboration problems. In contrast, some forms of network embeddedness influence alliance dissolution because they provide stability to relationships that, although expected to be attractive, are prone to instability. Hence, while examination of alliance formation shows that network embeddedness helps firms minimize potential collaboration problems, examination of alliance dissolution reveals that some types of network embeddedness enable firms to pursue alliances that have attractive potential benefits despite the presence of obstacles to collaboration.
With respect to research on joint ventures, this study shows how the aggregate network of relationships among a set of firms affects joint venture survival, moving this literature beyond the traditional dyadic level of analysis. According to the dyadic perspective in prior work, the key social mechanisms for maintaining order in an alliance are the mutual trust that partners develop and "the shadow of the future", which reflects the benefits of continuing the relationship (Gulati, 1995b; Heide & Miner, 1992; Parkhe, 1993b) . By adopting a broader network perspective, we emphasize the "shadow of others" that arises from structural embeddedness as an additional social mechanism for maintaining order in joint ventures. The "shadow of others" arises because partners have incentives to behave fairly with allies due to concern for sanctions that common partners may impose. Thus, while prior work has shown that competitive tensions increase the hazard of joint venture dissolution, this study shows that it is precisely in such highrisk relationships that embedding the alliance in a network of common partners most contributes to mitigating this hazard, a finding of both theoretical and practical importance.
NETWORK EMBEDDEDNESS AND JOINT VENTURE DISSOLUTION
Extant literature has indicated that relational, positional, and structural embeddedness influence alliance formation (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) and also demonstrated that relational embeddedness mitigates tie instability (Broschak, 2004; Kogut, 1989; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Park & Russo, 1996; Uzzi, 1996) . Hence, while controlling empirically for the influence of relational embeddedness, we focus on how the informational and reputational benefits of positional embeddedness (e.g., Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Powell et al., 1996) and the social monitoring advantages of structural embeddedness (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Gulati, 1995b; Walker et al., 1997) affect the hazard of unplanned joint venture dissolution.
Informational and Reputational Benefits of Positional Embeddedness
Positional embeddedness relates to the extent to which organizations occupy a central position in the network structure (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) . Firms in central network positions have an increased scope over non-central firms for collecting and disseminating information.
The information that flows to central firms helps them identify alliance opportunities and select partners that possess appropriate resources and demonstrate reliable collaborative behavior (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1995b) . The greater the combined centrality of two firms, the fewer informational constraints they face when searching for partners, which, in turn, suggests that if these firms ally, it is because they knowingly regard each other as appropriate partners. Further, the informational benefits accruing to central firms also enhance trust between partners (Gulati et al., 2000; Gulati & Singh, 1998) , and can be thought of as providing an initial stock of trust that enables partners to collaborate more effectively during the course of the alliance.
Simply extending the argument proposed in the alliance formation literature to its logical conclusion, we argue that the informational benefits that network central firms possess enhance the stability of the alliance that they form. If two central firms choose each other as partners, they can ex-ante expect to have made better partnering choices leading to a more stable alliance than partnering with non-central firms. In other words, if firms' ex-ante expectations about the value of the network in helping them choose partners are true, we should expect centrally positioned firms to form more stable alliances than non-central firms.
The informational benefits of centrality are most relevant when firms are searching for partners and forming joint ventures. Information gathered after the start of the alliance has less value because it is likely to overlap with information partners already possess. Moreover, even if a firm needs further information about its ally after the joint venture founding, its own tie with the partner can provide this information, without reference to network positions.
Hypothesis 1a. The greater the combined network centrality of two firms at joint venture founding (positional embeddedness), the lower the hazard of unplanned joint venture dissolution at any subsequent point.
Relational embeddedness refers to the presence of prior direct ties between two firms, which enable the exchange of information about each other's capabilities and reliability, enhance mutual trust and, in turn, mitigate the hazard of joint venture dissolution (Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 1997) . While controlling for the direct effect of relational embeddedness, we argue that because relational embeddedness (like positional embeddedness) produces informational benefits, it is likely to moderate the impact of positional embeddedness.
To understand the moderating effect of relational embeddedness, note that in the absence of a prior direct tie between two firms, their current network positions function as partial surrogates for the missing relationship and help them learn about each other through their allies.
When two firms have collaborated prior to the formation of an additional alliance, by contrast, their current network positions convey less novel information because their prior ties allowed them to observe each other's competencies and behavior directly.
Although the information that a firm collects directly from its partner may not fully overlap with the information that stems from positional embeddedness (Burt, 1992; Gulati, 1995b) , it reduces the marginal value of the information the firm obtains through its network position. Moreover, the knowledge-based trust resulting from superior information that two central partners have prior to forming a joint venture partly overlaps with the knowledge-based trust stemming from prior direct ties. Hence, partner's centrality in the network structure will have less influence on joint venture dissolution when the partners have prior direct ties. In addition to informational benefits, positional embeddedness also offers reputational advantages. Central firms are perceived to be capable and reliable partners relative to firms that occupy peripheral network positions (Powell et al., 1996) . Centrally positioned firms generally prefer to ally with organizations that occupy similar positions to mitigate the hazards of collaboration and to avoid diminishing their reputations (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1994) . Further, the positional imbalance between a central and a peripheral actor creates power imbalance between them (Mizruchi, 1982) . Although the reputational imbalance inherent in asymmetric relationships is a source of instability, firms sometimes form asymmetric partnerships with the expectation of accessing complementary resources (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Mitchell & Singh, 1996) . Peripheral firms, in turn, have incentives to ally with central partners because such collaboration can vouch for their reliability and enhance their reputations (Podolny, 1994) .
Again, while a strict interpretation of the instrumental goals associated with reputational imbalance is that if positionally asymmetric partners form an alliance it is because they expect benefits to outweigh potential collaboration problems, the fact remains that over time new and only partially predictable circumstances can shift the balance of benefits that partners can derive from the alliance, thus creating tension between the partners. The more central firm may derive greater private benefits than its partner expected because its wider portfolio of relationships, skills, and absorptive capacity allow it to leverage the benefits from the information it receives (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002) , well beyond what its partner anticipated. Alternatively, the asymmetry might well favor the less embedded partner, because the affiliation ends up providing a reputation enhancement beyond what the central partner predicted, or may be used by the less embedded partner to obtain relationships with additional relatively central partners (Ahuja, Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009) .
By shifting the balance of benefits that positionally asymmetric partners can derive from the alliance, partners' reputational imbalance at the outset of collaboration increases their tendency to revisit the terms negotiated for the alliance in an attempt to restore exchange balance (Cook, 1977; Emerson, 1972) and affects the amount of resources they allocate to the joint venture (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998) . These factors, along with shifts in bargaining power during the course of the alliance, create alliance instability (Das & Teng, 2000; Kogut, 1989) .
Hypothesis 2. Joint ventures formed between a high-centrality and a low-centrality firm (positional asymmetry) experience greater hazard of unplanned dissolution than joint ventures between firms with similar centrality (positional symmetry).

Social Monitoring Benefits of Structural Embeddedness
We now turn to structural embeddedness, which refers to the presence of common partners between allies (Coleman, 1988) . The common partners between two organizations encompass the set of direct ties common to both of them. Prior studies on alliance formation have shown that the presence of common partners between two firms provides referral advantages that increase their propensity to ally (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) .
Besides referral advantages, structural embeddedness also produces social monitoring benefits that help organizations monitor and enforce collaborative behavior (Coleman, 1988) .
The presence of common partners engenders deterrence-based trust by giving greater visibility to norm-breaking behavior. If, in a relationship between two firms, one partner exploits the vulnerabilities of the other, the occurrence of such behavior can be revealed to common partners and, through them, reach a larger number of firms in the network. The presence of common partners produces social monitoring benefits because it amplifies opportunities to sanction normbreaking. Even if the firm that faces opportunism is unable to impose sanctions on the ally, common partners may inflict penalties on the norm-breaker. The deterrence-based trust stemming from common partners between two firms helps mitigate the incidence of collaboration problems between them.
An alternative way in which partners can deter opportunistic behavior is by resorting to formal governance structures, such as joint ventures, to govern collaboration. Firms commonly resort to joint ventures to organize collaboration when they perceive high interorganizational hazards at the time they create the alliance (Gulati & Singh, 1998) . Because of the joint commitment of resources and the administrative apparatus required for their operation, joint ventures help align incentives between partners (Kogut, 1988) . The mutual hostage positions implied by the shared equity in a joint venture engender deterrence-based trust between partners.
The social monitoring benefits of structural embeddedness reinforce the deterrence-based trust inherent in the governance structure of joint ventures. Even if partners form a joint venture in the presumption that the benefits will supersede potential collaboration problems, new circumstances arising during the course of the alliance can shift the balance of partners'
incentives and, as a result, engender instability. Structural embeddedness, however, helps firms deter the occurrence of opportunistic behavior. If a firm behaves opportunistically in the context of a joint venture, it faces the risk of punishment not only by the venture partner but also by all other partners they have in common.
Additionally, common partners may impose reputational damage on the norm-breaking firm and refrain from forming future alliances with that firm (Park & Ungson, 1997) . The fear of loss of reputation deters firms linked by common partners from behaving opportunistically (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati & Westphal, 1999) . Hence, common partners increase the cost of opportunism by affecting not only current ties but also potential future ties of the norm- Whereas informational and reputational benefits of positional embeddedness are greatest at the time of joint venture founding, by ensuring that firms ally with the right partners, the social monitoring benefits of structural embeddedness accrue at any point of network evolution. When two firms create a joint venture, the partners they have in common confer deterrent effects.
During the course of the alliance, as the number of common partners linking two firms increases, the social monitoring effects become stronger. Additional common partners enhance firms' embeddedness in local networks (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) , reinforce firms' concern for local reputation and, as a consequence, further mitigate interorganizational hazards.
Hypothesis 3. The more common partners that two firms possess at any point of network evolution (structural embeddedness), the less the hazard of unplanned joint venture dissolution.
Because the presence of common partners increases the costs of opportunism, we expect the deterrent benefits that common partners provide to be more pronounced when the edge of incentives to behave opportunistically is especially sharp. Firms sometimes form alliances that are prone to instability because the formation incentives go hand in hand with factors that increase the chance of shifts in the balance of partners' incentives, which is a source of instability. For instance, as we argued earlier, although firms form positionally asymmetric ties with the expectation of accessing complementary resources, the partners' reputational imbalance increases their propensity to behave opportunistically after alliance formation. Likewise, although firms have incentives to ally with partners exhibiting competitive overlap in order to manage mutual competitive interdependence (Gimeno, 2004; Kogut, 1988; Park & Ungson, 2001; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976) , partners exhibiting competitive overlap are more likely to let competitive incentives overrule the benefits of collaboration (Chen, 1996; Kogut, 1989; Park & Ungson, 1997) . We argue that the deterrent effects of common partners mitigate collaboration hazards especially in these types of alliances that, despite the expected benefits, have high risk of experiencing collaboration problems.
Common partners and positional asymmetry. As Hypothesis 2 predicts, partners' reputational imbalance at joint venture founding increases the chances that they will experience collaboration problems during the course of the alliance, which in turn exacerbates the importance of common partners as a stabilizing mechanism. When positionally symmetric firms create a tie, the structural similarity of the partners and the relatively congruent attendant routines, processes, and objectives provide a degree of stability to the alliance. But when asymmetric partners form a tie, fewer of these stability-enhancing factors are present, which in turn enhances the value of common partners as mechanisms of stability. Hence, in joint ventures created between positionally asymmetric partners, the norms and reputational pressures associated with the presence of common partners in the ongoing network structure become more relevant to mitigating collaboration problems than in joint ventures formed between positionally symmetric partners, which are less likely to experience collaboration hazards in the first place.
Hypothesis 4. The number of common partners (structural embeddedness) will contribute more to mitigating the hazard of unplanned joint venture dissolution when one firm has high-centrality and the other has low-centrality (positional asymmetry) than when firms have similar centrality (positional symmetry).
Common partners and competitive overlap. Previous research has argued that interfirm ties enhance the likelihood of coordination, tacit or otherwise, and has shown that firms with high levels of competitive overlap form joint ventures in an attempt to manage their competitive interdependence (Kogut, 1988; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976) . However, the attempt to manage mutual competitive intensity is both an incentive to form joint ventures and a source of instability (Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996) . Firms that exhibit greater resource similarity and market commonality have high propensity to engage in interfirm rivalry (Chen, 1996) and represent a competitive threat to each other (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976) . They can, for example, enter or reinforce their presence in markets where competitors operate and, by doing so, affect each other's performance and viability (Barnett, 1997) .
Some scholars have argued that firms with high levels of competitive overlap, fearing retaliation, may curb competitive actions and engage in less vigorous competition (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985) . However, the stability of such mutual forbearance is fragile in the face of competitive incentives (Baum & Korn, 1999; Stigler, 1964) . When partners exhibit high competitive overlap, there is a high probability that one will learn about the other's vulnerabilities and encounter opportunities to exploit those weaknesses. Direct retaliation between firms with high competitive overlap may lead to escalation of mutual rivalry and become either ineffective or overly costly. As a result, enforcement through common partners becomes even more important in relationships between firms that have high competitive overlap.
Hypothesis 5. The number of common partners (structural embeddedness) will contribute more to mitigating the hazard of unplanned joint venture dissolution when firms have high competitive overlap than when firms have low competitive overlap.
Figure 1 summarizes our hypotheses about the influence of different aspects of network embeddedness on unplanned joint venture dissolution.
METHODS
We used data on the duration of technology-related joint ventures formed among the leading firms in the global chemicals industry. Although joint ventures constitute formal interfirm ties (Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Gulati & Singh, 1998 ) that require significant relationship-specific investments and imply high exit costs (Gulati, 1995a; Rowley et al., 2000) , partners often dissolve the alliance before reaping the joint benefits (Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 1997) . Joint ventures involving technology are especially vulnerable to opportunism (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Singh, 1998) and, hence, constitute an appropriate context for examining the influence of network embeddedness on unplanned alliance dissolution.
Using trade journals such as Chemical Week and C&E News, we identified a primary sample of 107 firms from Western Europe, Japan, and the U.S. -the core of the global chemicals industry. Because collecting reliable, comprehensive data on joint venture formation and dissolution is difficult for smaller firms, past network studies used a similar strategy of focusing on the leading firms in an industry (Gulati, 1995b; Rosenkopf, Metiu, & George, 2001) . Reliable financial and other data were not available for 10 firms, limiting the analysis to 97 firms.
We collected data on the joint venture activity of the 97 companies between 1979 and 1991. The period of analysis starts in 1979 because that is when news media databases began to systematically report data on interfirm collaboration (Gulati, 1995b; Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1989) . Prior studies suggest that alliance activity was low until the early 1980s (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hergert & Morris, 1988 A joint venture ceases to exist when partners liquidate the joint venture, when one firm acquires the stake of the partner, or when partners sell their stake to a third party (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996) . Although dissolution represents only one form of alliance performance, it usually reflects a business failure or irresolvable conflict between partners (Gehringer & Herbert, 1989; Kogut, 1989) . To ascertain whether the cases of dissolution in the sample reflected collaboration problems, we examined the new stories about each dissolved joint venture. In a few cases, dissolution reflected goal attainment or changes in the business landscape unrelated to partners' opportunistic behavior. We did not consider these cases to be unplanned dissolution, as they do not reflect the types of interfirm hazards we discuss in the paper. In the vast majority of cases, unplanned joint venture dissolution reflected either partners' difficulty in collaborating or an attempt by one of the partners to exploit a particular business opportunity alone rather than share the benefits. Appendix A presents examples of joint venture dissolution.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable in our study is the hazard of unplanned dissolution of a joint venture by two firms in a given year. We created a dummy variable for each dyad in each year until the year of dissolution or until 1992, whichever occurred first (one if the firms dissolved the joint venture in that year and zero otherwise). Our analysis of the reasons leading to joint venture dissolution enabled us to identify 31 cases of unplanned dissolution 2 . The average duration of joint venture dyads that experienced unplanned dissolution was 3.5 years with a standard deviation of 2.2 years.
Independent variables
Combined centrality at founding (positional embeddedness). In line with prior studies, we measured each firm's position in the network structure using Bonacich's (1987) eigenvector centrality scores (e.g., Chung et al., 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1994) . This measure suits our analysis because it takes into account that a firm has greater scope for collecting and disseminating information when it is linked to a greater number of partners and when partners are themselves well connected in the network structure, that is, this measure results in higher centrality scores for firms that are linked to many firms, which are in turn linked to many other firms. The combined centrality of the two firms in the dyad is the geometric mean of the two firms' scores in the joint venture founding year (Mizruchi, 1993) , each firm's score being normalized relative to the most central firm in that year (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) . Our findings are robust to using the arithmetic mean of the centrality scores. We computed the centrality scores using UCINET 5 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 1999) . To test Hypothesis 1b, we split observations into two groups, one with, and the other without, prior direct ties.
Positionally asymmetric dyads at founding (positional asymmetry). Interorganizational networks display a pattern of core-periphery structures (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) and firms' behavior is affected by whether they occupy central or peripheral network positions (Mizruchi, 1993) . Reputational imbalance arises when partners occupy different status brackets, that is, when one partner belongs to a high-status group while the other is a member of a low-status group (Podolny, 1993) . We adopted Mizruchi's (1992) procedure to identify dyads between a central and a peripheral firm. For each dyad we coded a dummy variable as one if one firm in the dyad had a centrality score lower than the mean while the other had centrality equal to or greater than the mean observed in the founding year, and as zero otherwise. We obtained similar results when defining central firms as those with centrality scores in the top quartile.
Common partners in previous year (structural embeddedness). We measured the number of common partners between two firms in the evolving network structure as the number of common partners they had in the year before the observation year (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Mizruchi, 1992) . To test Hypotheses 4 and 5, we interacted this variable, respectively, with the measures capturing positionally asymmetric dyads at founding and competitive overlap.
Control variables
Prior research showed that relational embeddedness between partners reduces the hazard of joint venture dissolution (Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 1997) . We control for this influence with a variable that contains the cumulative number of prior joint ventures formed between the partners until the year preceding alliance founding. We also added a variable with the number of ties that partners formed since the founding of the focal joint venture to control for the possibility that firms may need to dissolve the focal joint venture to free up resources and use them to seize emerging alliance opportunities.
Because firms exhibit high propensity to engage in mutual competitive behavior when they have a high degree of similarity in both the resources that they possess and the markets where they operate (Chen, 1996) , we measured competitive overlap as a dummy variable set to one if the firms in the dyad had high technical resource overlap and high market overlap, and to zero otherwise 3 . We considered overlap along each dimension to be high if the respective score for firms in the dyad was above the sample mean. Sensitivity analysis found robust results using above-the-median and top-quartile measures of high overlap.
To measure firms' overlap along each dimension in a given year we used the Euclidean distance between them (Sohn, 2001) , which takes the value (Σ k=1,n (P ikt -P jkt ) 2 ) 1/2 , where P ikt (P jkt ) captures the proportion of firm i's (firm j's) resources in each of n areas where resources might overlap. We used patent data to measure firms' technical resources (Griliches, 1990; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001 ). To measure technical resource overlap we used the proportion of firms' patent applications in each of the 80 technological classes that chemical companies use.
To measure overlap of market resources we considered the average of firms' overlap in terms of both geographic and product markets. For geographic overlap we used the proportion of subsidiaries that firms owned in each of 156 countries and for product-market overlap we used the proportion of sales they obtained in each of 120 market segments defined at the level of fourdigit SIC codes. These measures vary between zero (complete overlap) and the square root of two (no overlap). To facilitate the interpretation of results we linearly transformed these measures and subtracted them from the square root of two.
Several variables address other possible influences. We control for the possibility that partnering firms' age affects the hazard of joint venture dissolution (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006) by including a variable with the difference between the firms' founding years (Park & Ungson, 1997) . To control for the possibility that the total amount of firms' technical resources affects the stability of the relationship, we added controls for firms' combined R&D expenditures and patents in the chemical industry. Further, we included measures to account for the possibility that differences in firms' financial performances or financial resources affect their propensity to dissolve a joint venture. Performance asymmetry subtracts the lesser from the greater value of return on assets (ROA) within each dyad. To measure liquidity asymmetry (current assets / current liabilities), and debt-equity asymmetry (long term debt / shareholder equity), we used the ratio of the lesser to the greater value within the dyad. We included a dummy variable to control for cultural differences (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997; Park & Ungson, 1997; Parkhe, 1993a) . This variable equals one when the parent firms were based in different regions (U.S., Europe, or Japan) and zero otherwise. We lagged all control variables. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables.
-------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here -------------------------------
Model Estimation and Econometric Issues
Because the time elapsed since tie formation may influence the hazard of tie dissolution (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988) , we chose a parametric survival function that enables the baseline hazard function to vary as a function of time and then estimates the influences of the covariates as multiplicative effects that either increase or decrease the baseline hazard. We used the Weibull distribution, which accounts for a monotonic effect of time (Barkema et al., 1997; Dussauge et al., 2000; Park & Russo, 1996) . Our results are robust to lognormal and gamma distributions that prior work used as alternatives (e.g., Dussauge et al., 2000; Park & Russo, 1996) . We use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the joint venture level to allow for non-independence of observations and correct for groupwise heteroskedasticity (Greene, 2003) . Table 2 presents the results. The natural logarithm of the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution is statistically significant in all models, showing that the hazard of dissolution increases monotonically with time elapsed since joint venture founding. Model 1 contains the control variables, while model 2 introduces the main effects and model 3 adds the interactions.
RESULTS
-------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
Hypothesis 1a predicted that firms' combined centrality at joint venture founding reduces the hazard of unplanned dissolution, while Hypothesis 1b predicted that this effect would be less when firms have prior direct ties. The logic drew on arguments about the informational benefits of positional embeddedness. In contrast to the predictions, however, model 3 shows that firms' centrality does not affect unplanned joint venture dissolution when partners are forming their first direct tie (β = 1.47, non-significant) but increases the hazard of dissolution when partners have prior direct ties (β = 12.58, p < 0.01). We note caution in interpreting the latter effect, due to the substantial correlation with direct ties at founding, so that the negative impact of direct ties at founding partially offsets the positive impact of the combined centrality measure for firms with direct ties. Nonetheless, the findings do not support our predictions. Although positional embeddedness may facilitate tie formation, premised on informational advantages that enable firms to select better partners, it does not decrease the hazard of unplanned joint venture dissolution. Instead, positional embeddedness can actually increase the hazard of unplanned dissolution when firms have prior direct ties. This unexpected result might stem from the formation of redundant alliances that generate fewer benefits to partners, which makes collaboration vulnerable to the emergence of more attractive opportunities.
The results support Hypothesis 2, which predicted that joint ventures between a highcentrality and a low-centrality firm experience greater hazard of unplanned dissolution than those between firms with similar centrality. This prediction built on arguments about the reputational benefits of positional embeddedness. As expected, results show that the partners' positional asymmetry at joint venture founding increases the dissolution hazard (β = 2.05, p < 0.001).
The results support Hypothesis 3, which predicted that the number of common partners connecting two firms reduces the hazard of unplanned joint venture dissolution. This prediction drew on arguments concerning social monitoring benefits of structural embeddedness. As expected, the presence of common partners between two firms in the evolving network structure mitigates the hazard of alliance dissolution. (β = -1.52, p < 0.05 in model 2, before adding interactions; β = -1.39, p < 0.10 in model 3, after adding interactions).
The findings support Hypotheses 4 and 5, which predicted that the benefits of common partners are exacerbated in relationships most vulnerable to instability, including joint ventures between positionally asymmetric partners and between partners with competitive overlap.
Consistent with the predictions, the coefficient on common partners is significantly more negative in positionally asymmetric dyads (β = -14.43; p < 0.001) and in dyads with high competitive overlap (β = -12.23; p < 0.001). Moreover, the statistical significance of the main effects of both common partners and competitive overlap declines once the analysis adds the interactions, highlighting the importance of the contingent effects (although the main effect of positional asymmetry remains highly significant in model 3).
Figures 2 and 3 show the multiplicative effect of social asymmetry and competitive overlap relative to a baseline group in which all covariates are zero. As the slopes in Figure 2 indicate, common partners contribute to reducing collaboration hazards more dramatically for positionally asymmetric firms. Similarly, the slopes in Figure 3 show that the stabilizing effects of common partners are more notable when firms exhibit competitive overlap.
----------------------------------------Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here ----------------------------------------
Several control variables in model 3 affect alliance dissolution. The presence of direct ties at founding (relational embeddedness), technical resource overlap, and liquidity asymmetry at least moderately reduce dissolution risk. Firms' combined R&D expenditures, performance asymmetry, and alliance transregional span at least moderately increase dissolution hazards.
Sensitivity Tests
To rule out the possibility that unobserved heterogeneity across observations affects our findings, we ran a model with a frailty distribution (Hougaard, 1986) , based on a gamma distribution. Model 4 shows that the findings we reported earlier are robust to this specification.
Moreover, the parameter of the frailty model is not statistically significant, suggesting that little unobserved heterogeneity is present.
As noted earlier, we were unable to unambiguously establish dissolution or survival for 24 dyads in the sample and assumed that they survived beyond 1992. We obtained similar results in models assuming that these dyads lasted only three, four, or five years after the year of formation. Further, to rule out the possibility that particular assumptions about the duration of these dyads affect the results, model 5 drops them from the sample and shows robust results.
Because of multicollinearity among the variables capturing firms' age asymmetry, combined chemical R&D, and combined chemical patents, we ran additional models with orthogonal measures for these variables (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Sine, Shane, & DiGregorio, 2003) . This procedure purges variables from information contained in the other measures. These models produced similar results. Results were robust when we dropped these variables in additional models, ruling out the possibility that multicollinearity affected the findings.
We argue that the informational and reputational benefits of positional embeddedness accrue to partners at joint venture founding, whereas the social monitoring benefits of structural embeddedness that accrue at alliance founding are reinforced through the life of the partnership.
In sensitivity analysis we added time-varying covariates with partners' combined centrality and positional asymmetry, as well as the number of common partners at joint venture founding.
Consistent with our arguments, we found that partners' combined centrality and positional asymmetry in the evolving network structure do not affect the hazard of alliance dissolution.
Further, we conducted a post-hoc analysis to examine whether results are robust to models, considering that the influences of embeddedness may vary with time elapsed since alliance founding (Greve et al., forthcoming) . We note caution in the interpretation of such analysis, since it entails the addition of interaction terms that compound multicollinearity 4 . The analysis showed robust results. Moreover, the analysis did not show that the effects of partners' combined centrality and positional asymmetry vary significantly over time. Addition of the interaction between common partners and time since founding, on the other hand, indicated that the influence of common partners on tie dissolution becomes weaker over time. Nonetheless, although this interaction was statistically significant, the main effect for common partners became more robust in both magnitude and statistical significance (p < 0.001).
Finally, we conducted sensitivity tests with sample selection analysis. If firms decide to form an alliance based on the factors expected to influence dissolution, empirical models of tie dissolution that do not account for this decision may be biased. To our knowledge, no previous empirical examination of joint venture dissolution has addressed this issue. As sensitivity analysis, therefore, we adopted Heckman's (1979) method to estimate firms' propensity to create joint ventures and used a self-selection correction term in the estimation of the hazard of unplanned dissolution. As Appendix B reports, this procedure showed robust results.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study reveals that the network structure, besides affecting which ties firms create, as prior research has shown, also affects the hazard of unplanned tie dissolution. Perhaps most strikingly, we find that positional and structural embeddedness have distinct effects on alliance stability. Positional embeddedness arising from combined network centrality does not stabilize alliances and may even contribute to instability. By contrast, structural embeddedness via common partners stabilizes alliances, especially in joint ventures between positionally asymmetric firms and between firms with high competitive overlap. Thus, common partners constitute a social mechanism for maintaining order, especially in risky interfirm activities.
Theoretical Implications and Potential for Future Research
By showing how different aspects of network embeddedness influence joint venture dissolution, this study furthers both network research and the literature on joint ventures.
Network research. This paper highlights and empirically demonstrates several ways in which the effects of network embeddedness on tie dissolution differ from its effects on tie formation. First, the literature shows that firms tend to form repeated ties. Our study shows that the benefits of relational embeddedness (repeated ties) partly overlap with the informational benefits of positional embeddedness (network centrality) and, as a result, repeated ties between central partners can in some cases result in increased hazard of unplanned dissolution.
Second, this study reveals that informational benefits of positional embeddedness, although they facilitate tie formation, fail to provide stability during alliance life. Superior information stemming from firms' positions in the network does not help partners manage the tensions that occur during the life of collaboration.
Third, the literature has also shown that, despite firms' overall preferences to form positionally symmetric relationships, firms sometimes have incentives to form ties with partners in asymmetric network positions. This study demonstrates that, despite the presence of instrumental goals motivating such alliances, the reputational imbalance inherent in those ties makes the resulting alliances more vulnerable to unplanned dissolution.
Fourth, the literature on tie formation shows that the presence of common partners allays firms' concerns about the reliability of potential partners and, as a result, generally has a positive impact on tie formation. The literature also shows that alliance governance mode is an alternative mechanism to mitigate collaboration hazards -firms prefer to structure the alliance in the form of a joint venture when they perceive greater collaboration hazards. Our study, however, shows that firms benefit from overlapping these two mechanisms: joint venture partners that have common partners enjoy more stable collaboration than allies lacking common partners.
This study also demonstrates a contingency that remained unidentified before this paperthat the sociological benefits of embeddedness are more valuable when the incentives for competitive or opportunistic behavior are greater. The findings show that social monitoring through common partners has a greater effect as a stabilizing factor precisely in situations where partners have otherwise strong incentives to behave opportunistically, such as in joint ventures between positionally asymmetric partners and between partners with high competitive overlap.
These findings, summarized in Appendix C, highlight the tension that firms face between alliance formation incentives and collaboration challenges. Sometimes the potential benefits of the partnership go hand in hand with factors that are conducive to collaboration problems.
Whereas network embeddedness affects tie formation by indicating which alliances have lower collaboration hazards, it affects tie dissolution by providing stability to alliances that, despite the expected benefits, are more vulnerable to collaboration challenges. Examining how different forms of embeddedness jointly affect alliance stability furthers our understanding of embeddedness by questioning the implicit assumption in prior literature that different types of embeddedness are additive and reinforce each other. Our study shows that the benefits of relational and positional embeddedness undercut each other, and that structural embeddedness can partly substitute for asymmetries in positional embeddedness.
Further, our study, when juxtaposed with prior work, draws attention to the fact that structural embeddedness provides two related but distinct types of benefits, and that these benefits map differently to the outcomes of tie formation and tie dissolution. The first benefit is that of referrals -firms are knowledgeable about their partners and refer them to the focal firm (Burt, 1992; Gulati, 1995b) . The second benefit is that of social restraint (Coleman, 1988; Dore, 1983) . Alliance formation reflects mainly the referral benefits of common partners, perhaps combined with some ex-ante expectation of social restraint. Alliance dissolution, on the other hand, offers an opportunity for a closer test of the social restraint mechanism. At the time that firms consider the decision to terminate a relationship with a partner, the referral advantage is no longer relevant; the social restraint is, meanwhile, a valid consideration. Forming a tie with its partner's partner does not require the firm to subordinate its immediate economic interests.
However, systematically staying in a relationship longer, even in the face of competitive incentives to break the relationship, reflects the suppression of an atomistic, transactional calculus for a longer termed relational perspective. Thus, tie formation and tie dissolution are not mirror images of each other; rather, they reflect distinct decision processes and offer opportunities to evaluate the efficacy of different embeddedness mechanisms.
Finally, this study draws attention to the dynamics leading to tie instability (Yan & Zeng, 1999) and sheds light on the appropriate time scales for social network research (Granovetter, 1992; Soda, Usai, & Zaheer, 2004) . The informational and reputational benefits of network embeddedness are more prevalent at the time of tie formation by helping firms choose partners who are more likely to engage in responsible collaborative behavior. By contrast, social monitoring benefits accrue even after alliance formation by providing deterrents to opportunism.
Future research on how changes in the network structure over time accentuate or diminish the benefits from network embeddedness can further expand our understanding of network dynamics. An interesting opportunity in this line of inquiry is the investigation of how tie dissolution, in turn, affects subsequent tie formation. Another fruitful opportunity for further inquiry would be to examine circumstances under which structural embeddedness may lead firms to jointly behave in ways that appear to undermine network stability, in the light of the unexpected finding in the study by Greve et al. (forthcoming) showing that firms connected by common partners are more likely to jointly withdraw from liner shipping alliances. The stabilizing effects of structural embeddedness are centered on the premise that firms connected by common partners refrain from behaving opportunistically due to concern with their other ties.
Consistent with that logic, a firm's decision to engage in opportunistic behavior despite the potential for sanctions by common partners may induce those partners to concomitantly discontinue ties with the norm-breaking firm. Hence, what appears as firms' joint withdrawal from alliances may indeed reflect common partners' decision to inflict penalties on normbreaking firms.
Research on joint ventures. Prior studies approached joint venture dissolution from a dyadic perspective and highlighted the effects of partners' prior ties, cultural differences, and competitive rivalry (e.g., Hennart & Zeng, 2002; Kogut, 1991; Park & Russo, 1996) . This study, in contrast, approaches joint venture instability from a broader network perspective and shows that the aggregate network of ties among a set of firms affects joint venture dissolution.
Complementing the dyadic perspective with a network approach has important implications for the management of joint ventures. The normative implication of the literature on alliance formation is that managers, if they could, should embed the search for alliance partners in the social context to avoid forming alliances with considerable potential to turn out badly. But, as this study highlights, managers can only partially foresee shifts in industry dynamics that can engender alliance instability. Prior research suggested that managers can resort to the administrative apparatus of joint ventures, coupled with contractual safeguards, to align partners' incentives and deter opportunism. However, because managers are unable to fully anticipate partners' future behavior, the formality of joint venture governance and the shadow of the future between partners are insufficient mechanisms of stability. By shifting from a dyadic approach to a network approach, this study highlights an additional mechanism through which managers can mitigate joint venture instability: common partners make the shadow of the future more dramatic by casting their own shadow over the relationship between two firms. The deterrence-based trust that common partners promote overshadows the incentives that partners have to pursue selfinterest at the expense of joint benefits and, as a result, reduces joint venture instability.
Future research can expand the literature on joint ventures by examining how network embeddedness, besides affecting tie dissolution, also affects other collaboration outcomes such as resource exchange and knowledge flow between partners during the course of the alliance.
The informational, reputational, and social monitoring benefits associated with network embeddedness may not affect only the patterns of joint venture formation and dissolution, but also the thickness of resource flow through network ties. Social considerations can affect network dynamics by influencing what flows through a given network at different points in time even if the ties in that structure remain relatively stable over time. Whereas this study expands our understanding of network dynamics by shifting the focus from tie formation to tie dissolution, one next step is to consider the dynamics in the content of network ties.
Limitations
Similarly to prior work on joint venture dissolution, we were unable to control for joint venture characteristics such as size or performance (Barkema et al., 1997; Dussauge et al., 2000; Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 1997) . Obtaining reliable data on specific joint venture attributes such as size and financial performance is extremely difficult, especially in a longitudinal study. However, the analysis does account for joint venture age, because the Weibull model enables the baseline hazard function to vary with time elapsed since founding.
To the extent that longitudinal data on specific characteristics of alliances become more easily available, researchers will have the opportunity to expand research on network embeddedness in new ways. The availability of these data would enable the investigation of how embeddedness affects other alliance outcomes such as innovations that partners jointly create or alliances' financial performance. Additionally, such data would enable further examination of the argument that network embeddedness may prevent partners from discontinuing poorly performing alliances (Kim et al., 2006; Seabright, Levinthal, & Fichman, 1992) .
Overall, the study highlights the challenges that even intendedly rational decision makers face in creating and managing successful alliances. Firms have many incentives to form alliances. However, the same social and economic forces that create formation incentives sometimes undermine the subsequent performance of the alliances and lead to their unplanned dissolution. We believe that the study provides a base for further work exploring these tensions. Heckman's (1979) procedure to account for potential sample selection bias in the analysis of the influences of network embeddedness on JV dissolution. For each pair of firms, we calculated the propensity of JV formation using a probit specification and created the term to correct for self-selection. This term captures the likelihood of a given dyad being observed in our sample of ties at risk of dissolution; its inclusion in the analysis of tie dissolution eliminates the potential for specification error. A similar approach has been used in the examination of alliance formation by previously connected firms (Li & Rowley, 2002) and of the effects of network participation on organizational profitability (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004) .
In the equation estimating the likelihood of JV formation we included year dummies to account for the effects of temporal unobserved heterogeneity. We used a random effects probit regression to account for the possibility of random effects across dyads. Further, to ensure that the selection equation includes at least one variable with a non-zero coefficient that does not affect the second equation, we did not include firms' combined size (partners' assets in the chemical industry) in the estimation of JV dissolution, since additional analysis showed that this variable has no significant effect on JV dissolution, thus echoing findings of prior examination (Barkema et al., 1997) . As Table B1 shows, the results are consistent with prior research. Firms' position in the network structure and firms' prior direct ties increase the likelihood of JV formation. Analogous to the findings of prior research, the results indicate that firms sometimes ally with positionally asymmetric partners (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) . Indirect ties between firms in our sample decrease their propensity to create a JV. This result corroborates the argument that firms resort to JV as the preferred alliance governance mode when hazards to collaboration are higher (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Oxley, 1997) . The presence of common partners allays partners concern with opportunism and reduces firms' need to resort to a formal governance structure. The findings reveal that resource overlap and market overlap encourage alliance formation, which is consistent with the argument that similarity reflects partners' interdependence (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976) and that it facilitates mutual learning (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001) . Firms possessing more resources are more likely to engage in technological collaboration and less likely to do so when they already invest relatively more in R&D. • Positional embeddedness (at founding) fails to mitigate alliance instability.
• Further, relational embeddedness moderates the effect of positional embeddedness.
• Despite the presence of instrumental goals motivating the formation of positionally asymmetric alliances, the reputational imbalance inherent in these alliances increases collaboration hazards.
• Positional benefits at founding may not translate into ongoing alliance benefits.
• The informational benefits of positional embeddedness partly overlap with superior information stemming from relational embeddedness. Combining positional with relational embeddedness can actually decrease alliance stability, possibly due to information redundancy and over-embeddedness.
Relational Embeddedness
• Relational embeddedness produces trust and encourages the formation of repeated ties between firms.
• Benefits of positional and relational embeddedness are not additive.
• Moderation relationship between positional and relational embeddedness.
Structural Embeddedness
• Structural embeddedness provides referral benefits that mitigate collaboration hazards and encourage the formation of alliances between firms that have partners in common.
• The governance structure of JVs is an alternative mechanism to mitigate collaboration hazards.
• Structural embeddedness discourages dissolution by providing social monitoring benefits.
• Structural embeddedness moderates the effects of positional embeddedness. Positional asymmetry is destabilizing but structural embeddedness mitigates this effect.
• Different mechanisms come into play in formation versus dissolution (referrals versus structural constraint).
• Moderation relationship between positional embeddedness and structural embeddedness.
